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Abstract
Respondent incentives are widely used to increase response rates, but
their effect on nonresponse bias has not been researched as much. To
contribute to the research, we analyze an incentive experiment embedded
within the third wave of the German household panel survey “Panel Labor
Market and Social Security” conducted by the German Institute for
Employment Research. Our question is whether attrition bias differs in
two incentive plans. In particular, we want to study whether an uncondi-
tional €10 cash incentive yields less attrition bias in self-reported labor
income and other sociodemographics than a conditional lottery ticket
incentive. We find that unconditional cash incentives are more effective
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than conditional lottery tickets in reducing attrition bias in income and
several sociodemographic variables.
It is well known that respondent incentives can increase response rates
(Church 1993; James and Bolstein 1990; Mercer et al. 2015; Singer
2002; Singer and Ye 2013; Toepoel 2012; Willimack et al. 1995). It is also
widely agreed that response rates per se are not a good indicator of survey
quality and that other measures, such as nonresponse bias, should be taken
into account (Groves and Peytcheva 2008; Singer and Ye 2013).
But it is much less clear what the effect of incentives on nonresponse
bias is. An increasing response rate does not necessarily decrease nonre-
sponse bias. However, if incentives increase the response rates of some
groups more than others, nonresponse bias is likely to be affected.
An increase in response rates only for subgroups who are likely to
participate anyway will increase nonresponse bias. Therefore, the desired
effect of incentives is to bring people who are less likely to respond into the
respondent pool.
Literature shows that cash incentives increase response rates more than
in-kind incentives, unconditional incentives have a higher effect than con-
ditional ones, and higher incentives increase response rates more than lower
ones (Church 1993; Singer, Groves, et al. 1999; Singer and Ye 2013).
Dillman et al. (2014), however, argue that the amount of the incentives
should be chosen carefully as incentives that are too high might create
suspicion rather than trust and might destroy cooperation.
The fact that unconditional incentives are found to increase response
rates more than conditional ones might be explained by social exchange
theory: Beyond economic interests, incentives can be used to establish trust,
which is more important than the incentive value (Cantor et al. 2008; Dill-
man et al. 2014). The potential impact of incentives on underrepresented
subgroups can be explained by leverage-saliency theory (Groves et al.
2000). Under this theory, the decision to participate in a survey depends
on various features of the survey, their relative importance to the sample
case, and how salient they are to the sample case. If an incentive is enough
of a positive inducement to participate, overcoming the negative and less
enticing features of the survey, it may pull people into the respondent pool
who would not otherwise participate.
The subgroups most affected by a monetary incentive are thought to be
those for whom money has a high importance. Economic models of survey
response stress that incentive payments may be perceived as compensation
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for the time and effort a respondent provides (Philipson 1997); such models
predict that a modest incentive should have a stronger effect on low-income
respondents (because their opportunity cost of time is lower).
Empirically, these predictions are broadly confirmed; for instance, Mack
et al. (1998) found that incentives of USD20 can disproportionally increase
participation of respondents from poverty and black households. Groves
et al. (2006) found that people who are less interested in surveys can be
brought into the pool by monetary incentives that serve as compensation for
lack of interest. In a meta-analysis of incentive experiments in face-to-face
and telephone surveys, Singer, van Hoewyk, et al. (1999) find some evi-
dence that incentives can improve sample composition by increasing the
response propensity for people who are otherwise underrepresented, such as
low-income people or nonwhites. Incentive effects on attrition in panel
surveys appear to be very similar to the effects in cross-sectional surveys
(Laurie and Lynn 2009): Unconditional incentives are more effectively
increasing retention rates than conditional ones, cash incentives more than
in-kind incentives, and higher incentives more than lower ones. As for
attrition bias, Laurie and Lynn (2009) conclude that there is some evidence
that incentives have the potential to reduce bias by disproportionally
increasing response for respondents with lowest response propensities.
None of these studies examines the effects of incentives on nonresponse
or attrition bias of survey statistics directly.
We analyze the effects of incentives on the attrition bias of survey
statistics using data from a German household panel that was specifically
designed to study people with low socioeconomic status. In the third wave of
this panel survey, an incentive experiment was conducted in which house-
holds were randomly given either an unconditional cash incentive or a con-
ditional lottery ticket, which has been the standard incentive in the previous
two waves. The experimental groups differ by two characteristics of the
incentives: conditional versus unconditional and cash versus in-kind incen-
tives. Although the effects cannot be separated, they are known to influence
respondents in the same way: unconditional incentives increasing response
more than conditional ones and cash incentives more than in-kind incentives
(Church 1993; Singer, van Hoewyk, 1999; Singer and Ye 2013).
Our question is whether unconditional monetary incentives affect attri-
tion bias differently than a conditional lottery ticket. We are especially
interested in the effect of incentives on estimates of personal income. This
is usually untestable because no valid information on nonrespondents is
available and therefore a gold standard for comparison is missing. For our
study, we have administrative data on the target variables for both
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respondents and nonrespondents and we can compute attrition bias directly
by comparing third-wave respondents to second-wave respondents serving
as our gross sample. We address our research question by comparing attri-
tion bias for the two experimental groups using administrative data.
Data
Panel Data
We use data from the first three waves of the German household panel survey
“Panel Labor Market and Social Security” (PASS). PASS is conducted annu-
ally to study the effects of the German “Hartz”—reforms that came into effect
in 2005 (see Trappmann et al. 2009). These reforms introduced a new welfare
system at the household level called unemployment benefit II (UB II). In
every wave, each sampled household in the survey receives a household
questionnaire and personal questionnaires for all members aged 15 or older.
The household questionnaire is completed by the head of the household, who
is determined by the household in wave 1 and who serves as the contact
person for the survey agency in the following waves. The questionnaire
contains questions about household composition, dwelling, household
income, and material deprivation, as well as received unemployment benefits.
The personal questionnaire contains questions about the individual’s employ-
ment status, employment history, and income. Households with completed
household questionnaires are seen as respondents to the wave. The interviews
for PASS were collected in sequential mixed-mode design (Computer Aided
Telephone Interview [CATI] and Computer Aided Personal Interview
[CAPI]). The first wave of data collection took place between December
2006 and July 2007, the second between December 2007 and August 2008,
and the third was conducted from December 2008 to August 2009.
PASS consists of two different samples to compare benefit recipients
and nonrecipients of the new UB II. About half of the sample from wave 1
is sampled from a register of UB II recipients at the Federal Employment
Agency. This is the recipient sample because all households had received
some kind of benefit by the date of sampling. The other half of the sample,
called the population sample, is selected from a commercial database of
residential addresses. In this sample, people with low socioeconomic stat-
us are oversampled by design because low-income households are of
special interest for the PASS survey as they are under higher risk of being
affected by changes in the welfare system. We analyze the recipient and
population samples jointly. Due to the overrepresentation of UB II
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recipients and low-income individuals, we can analyze the effect of the
two types of incentives on these groups who are often a small proportion
of the sample in other surveys.
The incentive experiment was conducted in wave 3. In the first two
waves, sample units received a thank-you card containing a stamp worth
55 cents with their advance letter, and responding households were given a
German lottery ticket (“Aktion Mensch,” worth €1.50 in the first, and
“ARD-Fernsehlotterie,” worth €5 in the second wave). In the experiment,
panel households were randomly assigned to two treatment groups. The
heads of household received two different invitation letters asking for their
and their family members’ participation: Heads of household were either
promised a lottery ticket (lottery group) for every family member who
completed the questionnaire or were sent €10 with their cover letter (cash
group; Bu¨ngeler et al. 2010). Note that the experiment compares a condi-
tional in-kind incentive to an unconditional cash incentive. Also, the mon-
etary values of each are different (€10 for the cash incentive and €5 for the
lottery ticket). We restrict our analysis on the heads of household as they are
the persons to be contacted by the field agency, are the ones to receive the
invitation letters, and work as a gatekeeper for the whole household. In
total, 16,091 households were part of the PASS wave 3 sample, including
4,031 wave 3 refreshment households who were not part of the incentive
experiment. We exclude 4,793 cases from our analyses who have only
responded to one of the prior waves and focus on 7,267 panel households
who responded to both waves 1 and 2. Of those, a randomly selected 985
were part of another experiment and are omitted from our analyses.
For this article, we analyze the remaining 6,282 households, 2,952 of
which belong to the recipient sample and 3,330 to the population sample.
Cases were randomly assigned to the experimental groups within these two
subsamples. In total, 3,163 cases were part of the conditional lottery ticket
incentive group, and 3,119 cases were part of the conditional cash incentive
group. For our analysis, we include household information (UB II status)
and personal information about the heads of household contained in the
administrative data. We split personal income into terciles for our analyses
(less than €980, €980 to €1629, and €1630 and more). The income variable
contains earnings from own employment only—social benefits are not
included. In addition, we examine sociodemographic variables that we
expect to affect response, like gender, nationality (foreign or German), and
employment status, whether the person has a job of up to €400 per month
that is not taxed and exempt from social insurance payments (“mini job”)
and age (younger than 30, 30–39, 40–49, 50–59, and 60 or older).
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Administrative Data
We use administrative data from the “integrated employment
biographies” (IEB) file provided by the Research Data Center of the
Federal Employment Agency to compute the samples’ true values. This
data set contains detailed employment (e.g., type of employment and
income) and benefit records (e.g., type of benefit) for the German work-
force, excluding self-employed and civil servants and individuals who
receive welfare. With these restrictions, administrative information is
available for respondents and nonrespondents to the survey. IEB data have
been found to be very reliable concerning employment status, wages, and
transfer payments (Jacobebbinghaus and Seth 2007). Although we use
these highly reliable variables, these data might contain some random
measurement error. Administrative data are available as spell data. These
contain multiple observations for each sample case that cover the begin-
ning and the end of a span of time during which the case is in a certain
state, like employed, unemployed, or benefit recipient. The variables of
interest are constructed from these data using reference dates. For respon-
dents, the date of the household interview is used. For all nonresponding
cases who were contacted in CATI, the date of the last contact was used.
We do not have contact data for cases contacted in CAPI, so we use the
end of the field period as the reference date for those cases.
Estimation Sample
In total, 5,179 of the 6,282 cases (82%) who participated in waves 1 and 2
responded to the household interview in wave 3. For all units within the
recipient sample, linkage to administrative data is straightforward as these
data are part of the sampling frame. Administrative data could not be linked
successfully for only five cases from the recipient sample. Most likely,
these were wrong or temporary entries in the frame at the date of sampling
and deleted from the records after the sample was drawn.
In contrast to the register-based recipient sample, cases from the popu-
lation sample need to be searched for in the administrative records. How-
ever, due to data protection rules, this is only allowed if linkage consent has
been given beforehand. In the population sample, 79.07% of the respon-
dents gave their consent for data linkage, and 77.93% of them could be
found in the records using probabilistic record linkage procedures. The
cases who could not be found in the administrative records are most likely
to be self-employed or civil servants as these groups are not covered by the
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administrative data. Sixty-two percent of the population sample cases could
be linked successfully (see Figure 1 in the Online Appendix). Given the
analyses from Sakshaug and Kreuter (2012), we do not expect much con-
sent bias in these data. In their analyses of the same survey, consent bias is
only found for age and foreign citizenship, and it is very small compared to
other bias sources such as bias due to measurement error or nonresponse.
Also, Beste (2011) finds that only respondents having a foreign citizenship
and respondents who receive no income at all might be underrepresented in
the linked data set. We do not expect that excluding respondents who could
not be linked to the administrative data or did not agree to the linkage
introduces significant biases into our analyses. For our analyses using the
administrative data, we use the 2,947 cases of the recipient sample and
the 2,049 cases of the population sample who were successfully linked to
the administrative data—which makes 4,996 cases in all.
Method
In general, the bias of a statistic is given as the difference of the statistic’s
expectation and the true population value. Attrition bias in a mean statistic
Figure 1. Relative attrition bias in income estimation.
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is defined as the difference of the estimated mean using the respondents
only and the estimated mean of all sample cases. We estimate attrition bias
directly using administrative data for respondents and nonrespondents of
the survey as a gold standard:
dbiasðyÞ ¼ ^yadmin; respondents  ^yadmin; sample: ð1Þ
To be able to compare attrition bias statistics across variables, we use a
measure of relative bias that equals the estimated bias standardized by the
full sample mean of the respective variable.
rel:dbiasðyÞ ¼
dbiasðyÞ
^yadmin;sample
 100: ð2Þ
Based on estimates calculated as stated in equation (2), we will compare
the relative biases between the lottery and the cash group. Confidence
intervals are computed using bootstrap, and 10,000 bootstrap replicates are
computed for each relative bias estimation. The bootstrap 0.025% and
0.975% empirical quantiles serve as the 95% confidence intervals.
Results
We find that the retention rate is higher for the unconditional cash group
(85.54%) than for the conditional lottery group (79.39%), and the difference
is statistically significant (p < .001). Concerning retention rates, we can see
that in this experiment, incentives work in the expected direction. However,
as an increasing retention rate does not ensure a decrease in attrition bias,
we will next analyze relative attrition bias for personal income and several
sociodemographic variables.
Figure 1 shows the relative attrition bias (including 95% confidence
intervals) in income estimation for the two incentive groups using admin-
istrative data (for numbers, see Table 1 in the Online Appendix). While
there is no significant relative attrition bias for any income category in the
cash group, there is significant relative attrition bias for the lowest and
highest income category in the lottery group. For the lottery group, the
proportion of people in the high-income group is significantly overesti-
mated and the proportion of people in the low-income group is significantly
underestimated. Even though the relative attrition bias is significantly dif-
ferent from zero for these two income categories in the lottery group, the
confidence intervals of the lottery and the cash group do overlap for all
income categories and although overlapping confidence intervals do not
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necessarily imply that there is no significant difference (see, e.g., Schenker
and Gentleman 2001), we take this conservative approach to evaluate dif-
ferences between the two experimental groups.
We can see a clear age effect, but this is not significant for each single
age category and incentive treatment: The proportions of the older age
groups are overestimated while the proportions of younger age groups are
underestimated (see Figure 2). We find significant relative attrition bias for
the lowest (30 years and younger) and second highest (50–60) age group for
both experimental groups, which is smaller for the cash than for the lottery
group. The relative attrition bias for 60 and older, however, is only signif-
icantly different from zero for the lottery group.
As for income and age, the confidence intervals for all of the socio-
demographic variables overlap for the two incentive groups. Also, relative
attrition bias is in the same direction for both experimental groups, except
for the proportion of females, which is not significantly different from zero
for either incentive group. Proportions of people who are born outside
Germany are only significantly underestimated in the cash group. There
is no significant relative attrition bias for the proportion of people having a
mini job, the proportion of people being employed, and the proportion of
people receiving UB II.
Summary and Conclusions
Our findings confirm that unconditional cash incentives increase retention
rates compared to conditional lottery tickets. But what is more important,
they produce less attrition bias in some of the key variables of the survey
at the same time. Cash incentives have proved useful to decrease attrition
bias in this low-income and benefit-related survey. Although our analysis
focuses on the aggregate survey outcome and we do not know how incen-
tives work at the individual level, we think that both leverage-saliency and
opportunity cost theories could explain these findings. According to
leverage-saliency theory, the impact of cash incentives should be highest
for people who lack other motivation to participate in the survey and for
whom money has the highest importance. Therefore, low-income people
might overproportionately be attracted by the cash incentive. They also
have lower opportunity costs for survey participation, and, according to
economic theory, a modest incentive of €10 will be more attractive to
them as compared to people who have higher opportunity costs for parti-
cipating in a survey.
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We do not have a clear interpretation for the unexpected finding that
the proportion of foreign residents is significantly underrestimated for
the cash group only. A possible explanation could be that non-German
residents did not understand why they were sent money and became
suspicious.
Our empirical approach has some limitations. The experiment varies two
incentive characteristics that cannot be separated, namely, conditional ver-
sus unconditional and cash versus in-kind incentives. Further research is
needed, ideally implementing a fully crossed experimental design compar-
ing the four possible combinations of cash versus in-kind and conditional
versus unconditional incentives. The third-wave attrition bias we analyzed
in this article might be different from nonresponse bias in the first wave of a
panel or in a cross-sectional survey as incentives might work differently on
initial nonresponse and attrition. As Laurie and Lynn (2009) argue, panel
attrition in previous waves leaves a sample of loyal respondents showing
high interest in the survey already and therefore be less responsive to
extrinsic incentives.
Future research should be conducted to show whether our findings hold
for cross-sectional studies and whether incentive effects are found to be
stronger or even found to affect demographic groups differently than for a
panel study. Furthermore, the panel survey in which the incentive experi-
ment was implemented oversamples low-income individuals. If incentive
effects are mainly driven by economic interests, one could expect respon-
dents with very high income, who are strongly underrepresented in our
study, to be less responsive to incentives. The somewhat surprising finding
that the proportions of high-income groups are overestimated in our panel
might also be explained by oversampling of low-income groups. Our high-
est income tertile includes respondents who might achieve a middle income
compared to the general population. Replicating the experiment for a high-
income or general population sample may help us understand the mechan-
isms underlying the incentive effects better. In addition, we were only able
to link sample cases from the commercial sample to the administrative data
who gave consent. Since consent bias is usually found to be very small
(Sakshaug and Kreuter 2012), and cases were randomly assigned to the
experimental groups, differences between groups are not expected to be
affected by consent bias.
Our findings are in line with the general finding that incentives have the
greatest effect on respondents who show the lowest response propensity.
Thus, we are confident that the findings are not unique to our study and will
hold across countries. We do not think these general relations will change
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over time. However, future researchers could increase the incentive amount
to counteract inflation when replicating the experiment.
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